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ABSTRACT
ANDREW C. GRACZYK: Housing Bubbles and Income Inequality
(Under the direction of Anusha Chari)
After a century of decline, income inequality has grown dramatically over the last several decades
and is now one of the principal economic realities of our time. The recent housing bubbles and
global financial crises have shown us that the Great Moderation may be over, and income inequality
may be a problem with which the next generation of economists will have to contend. There is
a growing body of literature showing that income inequality has the potential to fundamentally
alter the very shape of the economic landscape. In this small collection of papers I show just a few
ways that the presence of income inequality can alter our expectations about how a market should
act in response to shocks, and the ways that shocks to a market in turn can accelerate the growth
of inequality. The first paper, Regressive Welfare Effects of Housing Bubbles, shows that, in an
economy with income inequality, a bubble attached to a durable, utility-yielding good can cause
harm to low income borrowers even before the bubble bursts by reducing their lifetime acquisition
of housing and consumption through higher prices and interest rates. This is in contrast to the
standard bubble literature in which bubbles generally only cause harm when they collapse. In the
second paper, Spatial Heterogeneity in Employment and Wage Growth After the Housing Crisis, I
show evidence that the spatial differences (across MSAs and occupations) in the post-crisis period
do not follow many of the general patterns that characterized the spatial differences of occupational
wage and employment growth over much of the preceding two decades. This may be evidence of a
new pattern of spatial economic differences at the MSA level after the housing crisis.
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CHAPTER 1
Regressive Welfare Effects of Housing Bubbles
1.1 Introduction
Many countries have experienced several episodes of bubble-like booms in asset prices. Examples
include the real estate and stock price booms in Japan in the 1980s and South East Asia in the
1990s; the housing price booms in Ireland, Spain, and the U.S. in the 2000s; and the current housing
price boom in China (27, 33, 21). In general, when there is a high demand for savings but limited
investment outlet, the rates of returns from investment are depressed and real estate investment can
serve as a prominent store of value. Thus, a low interest rate environment, as seen in the recent
decade, provides a fertile ground for the emergence of asset bubbles, especially in real estate. Given
the prevalence of bubble episodes, a central question arises for academics and policymakers: What
are the welfare effects of asset bubbles, especially bubbles in real estate?
In this paper, we highlight the nuanced welfare effects of bubbles that are attached to housing.
We develop a simple overlapping generations (OLG) model of bubbles with intra-generation
heterogeneity and financial friction. As described in section 1.2 of the paper, households have
identical preferences over a perishable consumption good and a durable and perfectly divisible
housing asset in fixed supply. Young agents receive endowments, and a fraction of them are savers,
who are born with high endowments, and the remaining fraction are borrowers, who are born with
low endowments. Young borrowers, given their low endowment, need to borrow to purchase the
desired amount of housing that maximizes their utility. In contrast, young savers, given their high
endowment, do not need to borrow and instead save income for old age. Thus, for savers, housing
not only yields utility dividend but also serves as a savings vehicle.
In an economy without financial friction, households can achieve their first best allocations
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by borrowing and lending in the credit market. However, in the presence of financial friction,
such as imperfect contract enforcement, borrowers face a binding credit constraint, modeled as an
exogenous limit on borrowers’ debt capacity, as in Huggett (26), Aiyagari (1), and Eggertsson and
Krugman (20).
In equilibrium, the constraint effectively limits how much savers can store their income by
investing in the credit market. As we show in section 1.3, in an economy with high income inequality,
there is a shortage of storage for savers, which can lead to an equilibrium interest rate that is below
the economy’s growth rate. The low interest rate environment in turn facilitates the emergence of
asset bubbles.
In section 1.4, the main part of our paper, we study housing bubbles. In a housing bubble
equilibrium, the price of one unit of housing consists of a fundamental component equal to the net
present value of the stream of utility dividends, and a bubble component, which grows at the interest
rate. The housing bubble causes two macroeconomic effects: it raises the equilibrium interest rate
and it raises the equilibrium housing price (relative to the bubble-less benchmark).
We then show that the housing bubble has opposite effects on borrowers and savers. On the
one hand, the housing bubble increases the return from real estate investment for high-income
savers, who demand storage of value, and hence increases their welfare (relative to the bubble-less
benchmark). On the other hand, by raising the interest rate on debt and raising the housing price,
the bubble reduces the wealth and hence the welfare of low-income borrowers, who in equilibrium
have a relatively high marginal utility from housing. By positively affecting high-income savers and
negatively affecting low-income borrowers, the housing bubble thus has regressive welfare effects.
Overall, the results so far imply a feedback loop on inequality: high income inequality depresses
the interest rate, thereby facilitating the existence of housing bubbles, which in turn have regressive
welfare effects.
In comparison, section 1.5 shows that the regressive welfare implications are lessened if the
model considers pure bubbles, which are widely used in the rational bubble literature for their
2
simplicity. A pure bubble is an asset that has no fundamental value,1 but which is traded at a positive
price. The pure bubble provides an additional investment vehicle for savers: besides investing in
the credit market and the housing market, savers can invest in the bubble market by purchasing
the bubble asset when young and reselling it when old. However, the bubble provides no useful
service for borrowers who do not want to save. Thus, unlike the housing bubble equilibrium, the
pure bubble equilibrium is characterized by an endogenous segmentation in the bubble market, as
only savers purchase the bubble asset. However, the pure bubble does crowd out savers’ investment
in household debt of borrowers, which drives up the interest rate on debt and restricts the amount of
resources available to borrowers in young age (relative to an equilibrium with no bubbles). This
means that the borrowers will experience lower lifetime welfare in the pure bubble equilibrium than
in the equilibrium without bubbles. But, since the pure bubble will not increase the price of housing,
the negative effect on borrowers’ welfare relative to the equilibrium without bubbles is smaller in
the pure bubble than in the housing bubble equilibrium.
Related literature. Our paper is related to the rational bubble literature, which has a long heritage
dating back to Samuelson (39), Diamond (17), and Tirole (41). For a survey of this literature, see
Miao (34).2 Much of the literature has focused on a positive analysis of bubbles. A common theme
in this literature is that rational bubbles emerge to reduce some inefficiency in the financial market,
such as an aggregate shortage of assets for storage or a credit market imperfection, as in Hirano and
Yanagawa (25), Miao and Wang (35), Martin and Ventura (32), and Ikeda and Phan (28).
By departing from the pure bubble assumption and modeling a bubble as attached to a funda-
mentally useful durable asset such as housing, our paper is related to Arce and Lo´pez-Salido (2),
Miao and Wang (36), Wang and Wen (42), Hillebrand and Kikuchi (23), Zhao (43) and Basco (9).
1Examples include such as tulips, fiat money, or stocks of an unproductive firm. In fact, the literature often uses the
boom in the stock prices of many dot com firms in the U.S. in the late 1990s and early 2000s as an example of a pure
bubble (see, inter alia, 32).
2There is another bubble literature that focuses on the role of information in coordinating agents’ actions to purchase
and sell bubbles. See, inter alia, Brunnermeier (15), Doblas-Madrid (18), Barlevy (8), and Doblas-Madrid and Lansing
(19).
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A common theme among Arce and Lo´pez-Salido (2), Zhao (43), and Basco (9) is that they focus on
setups where agents have heterogeneous preferences for housing, and they define a housing bubble
as an equilibrium where some agents, who derive no direct utility or use from an asset, purchase
the asset purely as a store of value. In contrast, we focus on setups where agents have identical
preferences and all derive utility from housing, and we define a housing bubble as an equilibrium
where the price of the housing asset has a bubble component. Our model of fundamental bubbles is
thus more related to Blanchard and Watson (12), Wang and Wen (42), and Hillebrand and Kikuchi
(23). The main difference is our paper’s focus on a welfare analysis. A second difference is our
emphasis on income inequality.
To the best of our knowledge, among papers that analyze the welfare effects of bubbles, ours
is the first to document regressive welfare effects of a housing bubble. Saint-Paul (38), Grossman
and Yanagawa (22), and King and Ferguson (30) show that if there is a positive externality in the
accumulation of capital, the emergence of bubbles on an unproductive asset would inefficiently divert
resources from investment. Similarly, Hirano et al. (24) show that oversized bubbles inefficiently
crowd out productive investment. On the other hand, Miao et al. (37) show that bubbles can crowd
in too much investment. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (16) show that bubbles can marginally crowd
out domestic savings and cause a shortage of liquid international assets in a small open economy
framework. Focusing instead on risk, Ikeda and Phan (29) show that rational bubbles financed by
credit can be excessively risky. The regressive welfare effects that we highlight are complementary
to the effects highlighted by these papers.
1.2 Model
Consider an endowment economy with overlapping generations of agents who live for two periods.
Time is discrete and infinite, with dates denoted by t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . The population of young
households in each period is constant with population Lt = 1 for all t. There is a consumption good
and a housing asset. The consumption good is perishable and cannot be stored. The housing asset is
durable, perfectly divisible. The supply of housing is fixed to one. The consumption good is the
4
numeraire and the market price of a unit of the housing asset is denoted by pt.
Heterogeneity. Each generation consists of two groups of households, savers and debtors/borrowers,
denoted by i ∈ {s, d}, with equal measure of each group. Each young household is endowed with
ei of the consumption good, where es > ed. In addition, each household receives an endowment of
 > 0 when old. Let es + ed+ = e be the total endowment the young.3
Preferences. Households derive utility from the housing asset and from the consumption good,
consumed both when young and old. Denote their utility function by U(hit, c
i
t,y, c
i
t+1,o), where h
i
t
denotes the housing and cit,y and c
i
t+1,o denote consumption in young and old age of a household of
type i ∈ {s, d} born in period t. We assume utility from consumption and housing separable such
that:
U(hit, c
i
t,y, c
i
t+1,o) = v(h
i
t) + u(c
i
t,y) + βu(c
i
t+1,o),
where β is the discount factor, and u and v : (0,∞) → R satisfy the usual conditions (u′, v′ >
0, u′′, v′′ < 0, limc→0+ u′(c) = limh→0+ v′(h) =∞).
Credit market and credit friction. Households can borrow and lend to each other via a credit
market. Let 1 + rt denote the gross interest rate for debt between period t and t+ 1. As in Bewley
(11), Huggett (26) and Aiyagari (1), we model credit friction in the simplest possible way: an agent
can commit to repay at most d¯ units of the consumption good, where d¯ > 0 is an exogenous debt
limit. This imperfection in the financial market will lead to a constraint on households’ ability to
borrow, as manifested in the optimization problem below.
A household purchases housing, consumes, and borrows or lends when young, and then sells
their housing asset and consumes when old. As in Lorenzoni (31) and Hillebrand and Kikuchi (23),
we assume a per-unit maintenance cost κ > 0 on the durable housing asset, which the household
has to pay before re-selling the asset.4 The optimization problem of a young household of type
3We thus effectively set the economic growth rate to be zero, but the results extend easily to any exogenous growth
setting.
4This cost prevents the housing price from exploding when the interest rate falls below the growth rate of the
economy.
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i ∈ {s, d} born in period t consists of choosing housing asset position hit, net financial asset position
ait, and old-age consumption c
i
t+1 to maximize lifetime utility:
max
hit,c
i
t,y ,c
i
t+1,o,a
i
t
U(hit, c
i
t,y, c
i
t+1,o) (1.1)
subject to a budget constraint in young age:
pth
i
t +
1
1 + rt
ait + c
i
t,y = e
i,
a budget constraint in old age (taking into account the maintenance cost of housing):
cit+1,o = (pt+1 − κ)hit + ait + ,
a short-selling constraint on the housing asset:
hit ≥ 0,
non-negativity constraints on consumption in both periods of life:
cit,y, c
i
t+1,o ≥ 0
and the credit constraint:
ait ≥ −d¯. (1.2)
Finally, to close the model, without loss of generality assume that the old savers own the entire
supply of housing in the initial period t = 0 . We define an equilibrium as follows:
Definition 1. An equilibrium consists of allocation {hit, cit,y, cit+1,o, ait}t≥0 and prices {pt, rt}t≥0
such that:
1. Given prices, the allocations solve the optimization problem (1.1) for all i ∈ {s, d} and t ≥ 0.
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2. The consumption good market clears:
cst,y + c
d
t,y + ptht = e+ ,∀t ≥ 0;
3. The credit market clears:
ast + a
d
t = 0,∀t ≥ 0;
4. And the housing market clears:
hst + h
d
t = 1, ∀t ≥ 0.
We will be mainly focusing on stationary equilibria, which are equilibria where quantities and
prices are time-invariant.
Throughout the paper we assume d¯ is sufficiently small so that the credit constraint (1.2) is
always binding in any equilibrium. Then, the credit market clearing condition implies that savers
must be lending and hence are not credit constrained. From first order conditions, we know this will
be the case when young age consumption for each household type obeys:
u′(cst,y) = β(1 + rt)u
′(cst+1,o), (1.3)
u′(cdt,y) > β(1 + rt)u
′(cdt+1,o). (1.4)
Therefore, both the equilibrium housing price and interest rate are determined by the first order
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conditions of savers. In particular, the equilibrium housing price is given by:5
pt =
v′(ht)
u′(ct)
+
pt+1 − κ
1 + rt
. (1.5)
Asset pricing equation (1.5) states that the price of one unit of housing in period t is equal to the
sum of the marginal utility from housing, plus the discounted resale value pt+1, net the maintenance
cost, and discounted by the gross interest rate 1 + rt. It is convenient for exposition to rewrite (1.5)
in terms of the price net of the maintenance cost:
pt − κ = v
′(ht)
u′(ct)
− κ+ pt+1 − κ
1 + rt
. (1.6)
Recursively substituting the equations for pt+1 − κ, pt+2 − κ, and so on yields:
pt − κ =
∑
j≥0
1
Πjk=1(1 + rt+k)
(
v′(hst+j)
u′(cst+j)
− κ
)
+ lim
j→∞
pt+j+1 − κ
Πjk=1(1 + rt+k)
, (1.7)
which shows that the price of housing (net maintenance cost) is equal to its discounted net dividend
stream, which we will call the fundamental value of housing, plus a pricing residual, which we call
the bubble component. We now proceed to show that this setup can support multiple equilibria: a
bubble-less equilibrium (where the bubble component is zero) and a housing bubble equilibrium
(where the bubble component is positive).
5This equation is derived from savers’ first order conditions:
pt
∂Us
∂cst,y
=
∂Us
∂hst
+ (pt+1 − κ) ∂U
s
∂cst+1,o
.
Because savers are not credit constrained, we have ∂U
s
∂cst,y
= (1 + rt)
∂Us
∂cst+1,o
, or equivalently,
u′(cst,y) = β(1 + rt)u
′(cst+1,o), which yields (1.5).
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1.3 Bubble-less Equilibrium
We start with the bubble-less benchmark. In this case, the housing price that solves asset pricing
equation (1.5) is simply the net present value of the net dividend stream:
pt − κ =
∑
j≥0
1
Πjk=0(1 + rt+k)
(
v′(hst+j)
u′(cst+j)
− κ
)
. (1.8)
We can then see that a stationary equilibrium exists with pt = pt+1 = κ:
pt = κ =
v′(hst)
u′(cst,y)
=
v′(hdt )
u′(cdt,y)
. (1.9)
In this case, using the consumption rule for savers we can determine the interest rate in the stationary
equilibrium as:
1 + r =
v′(hs)
βκu′(cso)
. (1.10)
We call this the bubble-less equilibrium. The equilibrium interest rate rn and housing price pn
(where the subscript n stands for no-bubble) satisfy the steady state version of (1.8) with pn = κ, as
formalized in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (Bubble-less equilibrium). There exists a stationary equilibrium with the price of housing
pn equal to the maintenance cost on housing κ in all periods. The interest rate in this equilibrium
will be rn < 0 for es sufficiently large.
The stationary bubble-less equilibrium is characterized by the first order conditions of the
savers:
pn = κ =
v′(hsn)
u′(csn,y)
,
u′(csn,y) = β(1 + rn)u
′(+ d¯),
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the first order conditions of the borrowers, who are credit constrained:
pn = κ =
v′(hdn)
u′ (cdn)
u′(cdy,n) > β(1 + rn)u
′(− d¯),
the budget constraints:
csy,n = e
s − d¯
1 + rn
− pnhsn
cdy,n = e
d +
d¯
1 + rn
− pnhdn,
and market clearing conditions: hsn + h
d = 1, csy,n + c
d
y,n + pn = e.
Proof. Appendix 3.0.1.
Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that rn is increasing in debt limit d¯, and decreasing
in savers’ endowment es. Thus, either an increase in credit friction (a lower d¯) or an increase in
inequality will lower the interest rate. As is well known, a low interest rate environment is a fertile
ground for bubbles to arise.
1.4 Housing bubble
We now construct an equilibrium, where in the asset pricing equation (1.7), the bubble component
in the price of one unit of housing (net of maintenance) is positive:
pt − κ =
∑
j≥0
1
Πjk=0(1 + rt+k)
(
v′(hst+j)
u′(cst+j,y)
− κ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
fundamental component ft
+ lim
j→∞
pt+j+1 − κ
Πjk=0(1 + rt+k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
bubble component bt>0
.
As we focus on a stationary equilibrium, the asset equation above simplifies to:
ph = fh + bh,
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where we use the subscript h to denote variables in the stationary housing bubble equilibrium. The
bubble term on the right of this equation converges to a finite, positive number if and only if rh = 0.
This means that the fundamental value can only converge to a finite, positive value if:
κ =
v′(hst)
u′(cst,y)
,
which means that the fundamental value of the marginal unit of housing purchased must be equal to
the maintenance cost on housing (fh = κ), with the price of housing now given by:
ph = κ+ bh. (1.11)
1.4.1 Existence and characteristics
Lemma 2 below shows that the housing bubble equilibrium can exist if and only if the bubble-less
interest rate is smaller than the housing bubble interest rate:
1 + rn < 1 + rh = 1.
Intuitively, when savers are sufficiently wealthy and maintenance costs on housing are sufficiently
high, the economy is dynamically inefficient and there is a shortage of storage for savers. A bubble
that arises in the value of housing helps reduce the dynamic inefficiency by raising the returns from
housing investment for savers. The housing bubble improves the storage service provided by the
durable housing asset.
The lemma below summarizes the existence condition and characterizes the allocations and
prices of the housing bubble steady state.
Lemma 2 (Housing Bubble Equilibrium). The housing bubble can exist with bh > 0 in a steady
state if and only if the bubble-less equilibrium interest rate has rn < 0. If rn < 0 in the bubble-less
equilibrium then there will exist a unique value of bh at which a housing bubble steady state can
occur.
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The housing bubble steady state is then characterized by the first order conditions of savers:
u′(csy,h)(κ+ bh) = v
′(hsh) + βu
′(bhhsh + + d¯)bh, (1.12)
u′(csy,h) = βu
′(cso,h), (1.13)
the first order conditions of borrowers, who are credit constrained:
u′(cdy,h)(κ+ bh) = v
′(hdh) + βu
′(cdo,h)(κ+ bh), (1.14)
u′(cdy,h) > βu
′(bhhdh + − d¯), (1.15)
and budget constraints:
csy,h = e
s − d¯− phhsh, (1.16)
cdy,h = e
d + d¯− phhdh, (1.17)
and market clearing conditions: hsh + h
d
h = 1, c
s
y,h + c
d
y,h + ph = e.
Proof. Appendix 3.0.2.
Corollary 3 (The bubble raises the price of housing). The price of housing in the housing bubble
steady state is greater than the price of housing in the bubble-less steady state:
ph > pn.
This must be the case since, for any bh > 0, ph = bh + κ > κ = pn. Therefore, as long as bh > 0,
the bubble attached to housing raises the price of housing.
1.4.2 Welfare analysis
We can now address the main question of interest: What are the welfare effects of the housing
bubble? We define the welfare of a household of type i ∈ {s, d} in the housing bubble steady state
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as U ih = U(h
i
h, c
i
y,h, c
i
o,h), where h
i
h, c
i
y,h and c
i
o,h are given in lemma 2. Similar for the welfare U
i
n
in the bubble-less steady state.
The bubble has heterogeneous effects on savers and borrowers. For savers, who want to save for
old age and use the housing asset in part as a savings vehicle, the housing bubble improves welfare.
This is because the bubble raises the interest rate (from 1 + rn to 1), hence increasing the return
from lending. This effect is summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 4. The housing bubble improves savers’ welfare: U sh > U sn.
Proof. Appendix 3.0.3.
In contrast, the housing bubble has an unambiguously negative effect on the welfare of borrowers.
This is because it increases the interest rate paid on debt, hence reducing the amount that borrowers
can borrow when young. At the same time, it increases the price of housing, hence reducing the
amount of housing that borrowers purchase and consequently their housing utility. This effect is
summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 5. The housing bubble reduces borrowers’ welfare: Udh < Udn.
Proof. Appendix 3.0.4.
The combination of lemmas 4 and 5 yields the main result of our paper:
Proposition 6 (Regressive welfare effects of housing bubble). The housing bubble improves welfare
for savers but reduces welfare for borrowers (relative to the bubble-less steady state).
This proposition highlights the regressive welfare effects of a housing bubble. The housing bubble
improves welfare for savers by providing them with a more efficient way to store value. However, by
raising the cost of debt and the price of housing, the bubble reduces borrowers’ ability to purchase
housing. Therefore, an interesting implication arises on the bi-directional relationship between
inequality and bubble: high income inequality depresses the interest rate, facilitating the existence
of housing bubbles, which in turn have regressive welfare effects.
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1.5 Pure bubble equilibrium
To appreciate the welfare results established in the previous section, we compare them against
the welfare effects of a pure bubble, which is an asset that pays no dividend but has a positive
market price. Common interpretations for this type of asset include a positive price on the stock
of an unproductive firm, fiat money, or the famous ”tulip mania” in the Netherlands. This asset
can be useful as a savings instrument. However, unlike housing, the pure bubble asset does not
give households any direct utility. As a consequence, there will be an endogenous segmentation
of the pure bubble market: only savers purchase the asset to store income for old age. This leads
to another important distinction between the housing asset and the pure bubble asset: it is never
optimal for borrowers to go into debt to acquire the pure bubble.
Formally, assume there is an asset that pays no dividend but is traded at price b˜t per unit
(assuming that the bubble has not collapsed). Given prices, each household of type i chooses its
holding xit ≥ 0 of the bubble asset. Their optimization problem is:
max
hit,c
i
t,y ,c
i
t+1,o,x
i
t,a
i
t
U(hit, c
i
t,y, c
i
t+1,o), (1.18)
The addition of the bubble asset will change the aggregate market clearing condition:
ptht + b˜t + cy,t = e,
where b˜t represents the total value of the bubble asset in time t. We assume a fixed supply of the
bubble, b0=1.
Budget constraints for young and old households respectively in this setup are given as follows:
ei = pth
i
t + b˜tx
i
t + a
i
t
1
1 + rt
+ ciy,t, (1.19)
cio,t+1 = (pt+1 − κ)hit + b˜t+1xit + ait, (1.20)
14
Households then solve their maximization problem (1.18) subject to the budget constraints, the
credit constraint:
ait ≥ −d¯,
non-negativity constraints on consumption in both periods of life:
cit,y, c
i
t+1,o ≥ 0,
and no short-selling constraints on housing and the bubble asset:
xit, h
i
t ≥ 0.
To close the model, assume that old savers own the entire supply of housing and the bubble in the
initial period t = 0. A pure bubble equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 2. An equilibrium consists of allocation {hit, cit,y, cit+1,o, ait, xit}t≥0 and prices {pt, rt, bt}t≥0
such that:
1. Given prices, the allocations solve the optimization problem (1.18) for all i ∈ {s, d} and
t ≥ 0.
2. The consumption good market clears:
cst,y + c
d
t,y + pt + b˜t = e, ∀t ≥ 0;
3. The credit market clears:
ast + a
d
t = 0,∀t ≥ 0;
4. The housing market clears:
hst + h
d
t = ht,∀t ≥ 0;
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5. And the bubble market clears:
xst + x
d
t = 1.∀t ≥ 0.
We focus on asymptotic pure bubble equilibria, where the bubble does not vanish, i.e., limt→∞ b˜t > 0.
A pure bubble steady state is an asymptotic pure bubble equilibrium where prices and quantities are
time-invariant.
1.5.1 Existence and characteristics
We now formalize the existence and characteristics of a pure bubble equilibrium. The first order
conditions of savers imply that the following no-arbitrage condition must hold for the bubble asset:
b˜t+1 = (1 + rt)b˜t. (1.21)
This equation equates the return from lending in the credit market and the return from speculating
in the bubble market for savers. It is a standard equation stating that in any pure bubble equilibrium,
the bubble price must grow at the interest rate. Intuitively, if this condition does not hold, then either
the bubble yields a greater expected return than lending (which means savers would never lend in
equilibrium) or lending would have a greater return than the bubble (which means savers would
have no demand for the bubble). It also implies a standard identity that the interest rate in any pure
bubble steady state must be equal to the growth rate of the economy (which we have normalized to
zero):
1 + rp = 1,
as in the housing bubble case (the subscript p stands for pure-bubble).
The first order conditions of savers and borrowers yield pricing equations similar to the bubble-
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less equilibrium:
pt =
v′(hst)
u′(cst,y)
+
pt+1 − κ
1 + rt
,
= u′(cdt,y)
−1 (v′(hdt ) + β(1 + rt)u′(cdt+1,o)(pt+1 − κ)) ,
which equate the price with discounted dividends of housing for savers and borrowers respectively.
In steady state, since 1 + r = 1, these equations become:
pp =
v′(hsp)
u′(csp,y)
+ pp − κ, (1.22)
= u′(cdt,y)
−1(v′(hdt ) + β(1 + rt)u
′(cdp,o)(pp − κ)). (1.23)
Equation (1.22) reveals that the price of housing must once again be equal to the maintenance
cost κ in the pure bubble steady state. Since only savers invest in the pure bubble, we can use the
savers’ young-age budget constraint to find an equation that determines the size of the bubble in
equilibrium:
b˜ = es − d¯− csp,y − κhsp, (1.24)
which confirms that the amount that savers invest in the bubble asset is simply whatever income
they have left over after consuming the optimal amount in young age, lending to borrowers, and
purchasing housing to satisfy utility demands.
The subsequent lemma shows that b˜ > 0 if and only if 1 + rn < 1, as in the case of the housing
bubble. As in lemma 2, it also characterizes the equilibrium allocations and prices.
Lemma 7 (Pure Bubble Equilibrium). The pure bubble can exist with b˜ > 0 in a steady state if and
only if the bubble-less equilibrium interest rate has rn < 0. If rn < 0 in the bubble-less equilibrium
then there will exist a unique value of b˜ at which a pure bubble steady state can occur.
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The pure bubble steady state is then characterized by the first order conditions of savers:
u′(csy,p)κ = v
′(hsh), (1.25)
u′(csy,p) = βu
′(b˜p + + d¯), (1.26)
the first order conditions of borrowers, who are credit constrained:
u′(cdy,p)κ = v
′(hdh), (1.27)
u′(cdy,p) > βu
′(− d¯), (1.28)
and budget constraints:
csp,y = e
s − d¯− κhsp − b˜p, (1.29)
cdy,p = e
d + d¯− κhdp, (1.30)
and market clearing conditions: hsp + h
d
p = 1, x
s = 1, csy,p + c
d
y,p + pp = e.
Proof. Appendix 3.0.5.
1.5.2 Welfare analysis
Are the welfare implications of a pure bubble different from those of a housing bubble? As before,
the welfare in the pure bubble steady sate is defined as U ip = U(h
i
p, c
i
y,p, c
i
o,p), where h
i
p, c
i
y,p, and
cso,p are given in lemma 7. In a low interest rate environment, a standard result is that a pure bubble
allows savers to store their income into old age more efficiently and hence improves their welfare
relative to the bubble-less benchmark. This result also holds in our environment:
Lemma 8. The pure bubble improves welfare for savers: U sp > U sn.
Proof. Appendix 3.0.6
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On the other hand, borrowers face a higher interest rate in the pure bubble equilibrium than in the
bubble-less equilibrium (rn < 0 = rp), which limits their ability to borrow when young. We also see
that the price of housing is unchanged from the bubble-less equilibrium. Therefore, borrowers will
experience less lifetime utility under the pure bubble equilibrium than in the bubble-less equilibrium.
We can then say that the pure bubble, like the bubble on housing, generates regressive welfare
effects.
Lemma 9. The pure bubble harms the welfare of borrowers: Udp < Udn .
Proof. Appendix 3.0.7.
But, there remains an important distinction between the two bubbles: the housing bubble, in
addition to increasing the interest rate, also increases the price of housing.
1.5.3 Welfare comparison across bubble steady states
We can also compare household welfare across bubble equilibria since both bubbles can exist under
the same condition (that 1 + rn < 1). We can show that borrowers have higher lifetime welfare in
the pure bubble equilibrium than in the housing bubble equilibrium. This is because the housing
bubble raises the interest rate and the price of housing for borrowers. The pure bubble also raises
the interest by the same amount, but does not raise the housing price. Therefore, borrowers are
always better able to acquire housing (and consume when young) in a pure bubble equilibrium than
in a housing bubble equilibrium.
Savers also prefer the pure bubble to the housing bubble. The housing bubble improves savers’
welfare over the bubble-less equilibrium by raising the interest rate and increasing the housing price,
but still requires savers to save excess wealth in housing. Since housing requires maintenance at
cost κ, the efficiency of housing as a store of value is always inferior to that of the pure bubble. The
pure bubble then allows savers to more efficiently allocate wealth across periods of life in the pure
bubble equilibrium than housing does in the housing bubble equilibrium.
Corollary 10. The pure bubble steady state Pareto dominates the housing bubble steady state.
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Proof. Appendix 3.0.8
1.6 Conclusion
We have shown that a housing bubble, or, more generally, a bubble attached to a fundamentally
useful asset, has heterogeneous welfare effects on borrowers and savers. By providing an additional
investment vehicle, it raises the returns from investment for savers and thus improves their welfare.
However, by raising the interest rate on debt and raising the housing price, the housing bubble
negatively affects the welfare of borrowers, who need debt to finance their purchase of housing.
Overall, our model implies a feedback loop on inequality: high income inequality leads to an
environment with low interest rates, which facilitate housing bubbles, which in turn have regressive
welfare effects.
Even though we model income inequality in an overly simple way, our model suggests an
interesting possibility that, in an economy with sufficient income inequality and credit friction,
consumption and welfare inequality can be exacerbated by the housing bubble. This result is
relevant for the ongoing debate about inequality, especially in the U.S.. Future research can explore
the interaction between bubbles and inequality in a more sophisticated framework of endogenous
income/wealth inequality (e.g., with longer-lived overlapping generations).
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CHAPTER 2
Spatial Heterogeneity in Employment and Wage Growth After the Housing Crisis
2.1 Introduction
In this paper I examine the structure of employment of different occupations across MSAs in
the United States, and find that there are very different patterns to occupational employment and
wage changes in the dot-com recession recovery period and the recovery from the housing bubble
recession, both in terms of which MSAs experience the highest growth and which and what kinds
of occupation groups recovered employment and wages during the crisis recovery.
I find that, in keeping with the theory of labor demand proposed in Beaudry et al. (10), occupa-
tions with generically higher cognitive task requirements experience greater wage and employment
growth than other occupations in most metropolitan areas between 1999 and 2004. However, the
model in Beaudry et al. (10) predicts that employment and income of cognitive-focused occupations
(for example: managerial occupations) should rise and fall in conjunction with other cognitively
demanding occupations, which is shown to be false in the post-crisis period: employment and wages
of different cognitive tasks are highly dissociated from one another in the 2006-2014 period.
This general finding presents a puzzle that has not, until now, been revealed in the data. This
is because this change in heterogeneity only reveals itself when looking at MSA-level occupation
data over all occupations and in the particular time periods in question without looking at long
run trends or aggregating to national trends. For example, (Autor et al.) analyzes and attempts to
estimate the widespread employment loss and wage stagnation among certain (tradionally non-
cognitive) occupations. But, their data sample does not capture the potential difference in post-crisis
employment and wage growth among those occupations as they specifically omit any data from
2008 onwards from the sample. Autor et al. (3) examines much of the same post-crisis wage trends,
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but focuses only on occupations that have lost wages (proportional to total sector income) and not
on all occupations.
Using the Occupation and Employment Statistics (OES) from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics
I look at employment and income distribution data for over six hundred occupation categories
across nearly four hundred metropolitan areas. Since the OES data is estimated from employer-side
samples of employment and income distributions among workers in a metropolitan area, it provides
a focused estimate of occupational employment and income distributions within a particular MSA.
With this data, I compare employment and income distributions within and across metropolitan
areas, across regions, and nationwide over time using a simple difference-in-difference method.
The analyses are broken into two time periods: 1999-2004 and 2006-2014. With these two time
periods we can analyze both ”normal” post-1980 changes to income and employment distributions
and those changes that coincide with the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath. The 1999-2004
period also contains the dot-com recession, which can further help us to identify the differences in
changes to employment and income structures coinciding with a ”normal” recession compared to a
financial crisis.
By highlighting structural changes to employment and income throughout the United States
at the metropolitan area level I can determine what common factors unite MSAs and occupation
groups that experienced the highest average employment and wage growth from 1999 to 2004 and
from 2006 to 2014 and determine what, if anything, is systematically different between the two
patterns of post-recession recovery.
The period from 1999 to 2004, was characterized by growth proportional to MSA wealth/population
levels across MSAs nationwide. Growth was not even across all MSAs, but it was similar across
MSAs for a given wealth level nationwide, and varied little with geography or other measured fac-
tors. Most occupations experienced average real wage increases, though high-income occupations
were disproportionately likely to see large increases in real wages.
Employment growth generally favored cognitive tasks over non-cognitive tasks: some of the
largest gains in employment between 1999 and 2004 occurred in computational fields, particularly
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those devoted to integrating computers and technology in business, and business administration.
But, employment and wages also tended to grow for non-cognitive tasks, just at a slower rate.
These results are generally consistent with historical post-recession employment recovery/growth
as documented in (14) and suggest that the 1999-2000 recession was not a vast deviation from his-
torical norms. This, alone, is interesting since the period was marked by rapidly increasing income
inequality nationwide, which some have argued reflects a substantial change in the labor market
(40) (7), specifically in the bargaining power of traditionally middle-class laborers as suggested by
Bound and Johnson (13), which could suggest deviations from historical patterns.
In the 2006-2014 sample, however, historical norms of recession recovery (as well as patterns
from the 1999-2004 sample itself) do not seem to apply. Neither occupational nor MSA average
employment growth follow any clear patterns: wealthy MSAs may attain higher employment growth
on average, but there is a high degree of variance, in large part driven by regional and state fixed
effects that were nor present in the 1999-2004 sample; cognitive and non-cognitive occupation
groups no longer appear to move as units; some cognitive tasks appear to become non-cognitive
tasks (judging by MSA-level employment and wage growth patterns), but only in certain States or
geographic regions. In this period, the patterns, where they exist at all, become quite different than
in the previous period, and there is no clear explanation of why this might be the case.
These findings show a significant change in growth patterns at the MSA level which may
represent some structural change in the way labor in different occupation groups are valued.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 details data and empirical methods
while sections 3 and 4 detail results and patterns for the 1999-2004 and 2006-2014 time frames
respectively. All graphs and figures are located in the Figures section at the end of the paper.
2.2 Data
The principal data that I use in this paper is the Occupation and Employment Statistics (OES) data
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
I examine two time periods with this data to find the structure of changes in employment and
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income nationwide across MSAs in two difference economic paradigms. First, there is the time
period from 1999-2004, which captures the dot-com recession and illustrates post-1980 growth and
a ”normal” recession. I use this time period as a baseline, as the employment recovery and wage
growth in this period closely reflects theories presented in (10). The 2006-2014 time period captures
the end of the housing bubble and the recovery from the 2008 financial crisis, which displays few of
the same patterns as the 1999-2004 time period at the MSA level.
I use the 2006 sample as the base year in my 2008 crisis recovery sample because, since the
2008 crisis and recession was, possibly, the result of the burst of a very large credit-backed asset
bubble (specifically, on housing), it is likely that 2007 or early 2008 employment and wage numbers
reflect the peak of an unsustainable economic boom and do not reflect the actual, relevant numbers
to which we should compare a stable recovery.
Data from the OES goes back to 1997 for most occupation groups, and back to 1988 for
some industry-level occupation and income data. But, observations before 1999 use different
occupation classifications for many occupations from observations in 1999 and later. While the
major occupation groups are nominally the same between 1997/1998 and 1999, major occupation
groups are missing employment and occupational income distribution data for most metropolitan
areas, making it difficult to compare occupational income distributions from 1997 and 1998 with
those from 1999 and later even for major occupation groups. In the interest of consistency, I
restricted my sample to 1999 and later years to avoid the problem of comparing occupations that
were not entirely similar. Where required, tasks for occupations are determined as ”cognitive” or
”non-cognitive” following the methods in (4) and (10)1
To ensure that all wages are comparable, I adjust all income data by regional CPI data from the
BLS. Using regional CPI rather than national allows for income in different metropolitan areas to be
adjusted more appropriately for the actual buying power of the region. Otherwise, tests for regional
effects and inter-regional comparisons would be skewed, as some regions have much higher costs
1Specifically, ”Cognitive” occupations include: Management, Financial, Architectural/Engineering, Mathemati-
cal/Computation, Health Care, Life, Physical, and Social Sciences, Legal Occupations, Arts and Design, and Education
and Training. All other BLS designations are considered ”Non-cognitive” in nature for the purposes of this analysis.
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of living on average than others. While municipality-level CPI data is available for a few cities,
the municipality-level data only counts consumers and purchases within the city itself, while the
metropolitan areas of the OES data generally encompass a larger area. All wages and dollar values
given in this paper are in terms of 2006 dollars as valued in the Northeast region of the United
States.
To examine employment recovery and income growth in each period I treat the locational
occupation data as a panel and perform a series of difference-in-difference measures to assess the
relative rates of employment and income growth of occupations across metropolitan areas and
regions of the United States. I compare the employment and income changes of each occupation
group in each metropolitan area against equivalent occupation groups in other metropolitan areas
and attempt to determine what, if any, patterns across metropolitan areas with better employment
and wage growth can be isolated.
2.3 Employment and Income Growth Distributions: 1999 to 2004
2.3.1 MSA Characteristics
In general, the metropolitan areas that experienced the highest average employment recovery after
the dot-com recession of 1999-2000 and wage growth between 1999 and 2004 were the largest,
most populous MSAs with the largest total gross income for all workers in 1999. These MSA’s
experienced higher average occupational employment growth and wage growth for all measured
occupation groups, with the exception of Manufacturing Occupations, for which employment
was very slow to recover during the sample period. There was also very little heterogeneity in
employment and wage growth patterns among the wealthiest third of MSAs: there was very little
regional dependence or spatial inequality within the wealthiest third of MSAs.
For example, the financial occupations, which experienced the largest average increases in
income nationwide, gained, on average, 4% more income in the top third wealthiest MSAs than
in other MSAs. Most other occupation groups experienced greater increases in average wage in
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the wealthiest MSAs than in less wealthy MSAs. However, this wage effect may simply reflect the
higher costs of living that wealthier MSAs often impose on their residents (relative to regional price
levels). What’s likely more important is the employment recovery in these wealthier MSAs relative
to less wealthy MSAs.
So, while there were changes in wage inequality and substantial heterogeneity in employ-
ment recovery and growth across occupation groups, the growth (or lack thereof) of occupational
employment and wages was generally consistent across MSAs (See figures 2.6 and 2.5 ).
These findings fit the general theoretical expectations of Beaudry et al. (10) and Autor et al. (6),
which posit that occupational employment and wage growth are driven by a model of variable task
demand and capital accumulation. We would then expect that MSAs with similar overall wealth
levels would exhibit similar overall patterns of occupational employment and wage growth and that
similar occupations would be in high demand in most areas, which is the general pattern we can
observe in the data.
2.3.2 Cross-MSA Heterogeneity
While there was some substantial heterogeneity in average occupational employment changes, the
occupations that saw occupational employment and average wage growth were largely consistent
across MSAs. For most occupation groups, the growth in employment and wages in an MSA was
roughly proportional to MSA population and total MSA income, though a few occupation groups,
specifically Production occupations and Transportation occupations, did not seem to depend on
MSA income.
This MSA size effect seemed to dominate most other effects that I can identify: there was a
slight difference in average MSA employment growth and occupational employment growth across
regions, but that was mostly driven by the fact that the top ten percent of wealthiest and most
populous MSAs are mostly concentrated in the Northeast and West Coast regions. Once differences
in MSA wealth in a region were accounted for, the region or State in which the MSA lies did not
have a very large impact on average or overall occupational employment over the 1999-2004 period.
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The major exception to this was, again, Production and Transportation occupations, which saw
a major occupational decline and very limited wage growth in the South and Midwest regions,
especially among lower-income MSAs. This is likely because these were the MSAs in which these
occupations still had large levels of occupational employment, however, as the occupation levels of
these occupations in these MSAs seemed to converge to national average location quotients.
A proximity effect, that is, a boost to wage growth for many of the more cognitive occupations,
especially Mathematical, Computational, and Medical occupations, was observable in MSAs within
80 miles of wealthier MSAs. Distances greater than 80 miles did not yield a systematic, noticeable
impact. This effect was present even after accounting for the wealth/population of the measured
MSA, but was small at only about 2-3 % additional wage growth on average for MSAs within 80
miles of one of the top 10% of wealthiest MSAs. There were some marginal wage growth benefits
to MSAs within 80 miles of the wealthiest third of MSAs, as well, but these average benefits were
even smaller (between .8% and 1.3% on average, with the proximity effect being slightly more
pronounced in the South). Below the top third wealthiest MSAs it did not appear that proximity to
other MSAs provided extra wage growth. Some, occupations, however, most notably Retail and
Food Service occupations, had a slight negative effect on wage growth from MSA proximity to
wealthier MSAs. For the wealthier MSAs, the proximity to less wealthy MSAs did not appear to
have any systematic, noticeable impact on employment or wage growth of any occupation groups.
These effect likely captures the competition that employers face from more wealthy MSAs for
traditionally high cognition tasks if MSAs are sufficiently close that commuting between them is
feasible. Similarly, it seems that workers in some of the less cognitive-focused occupations (like
Retail or Food Service occupations) may have faced some increased competition in their own MSAs
from more wealthy and populous neighbors, which could have slowed wage growth.
There was also a slight, noticeable Coastal Effect. That is, MSAs with boundaries that are within
60 miles of an ocean experienced, on average, 4% more total employment growth (mostly concen-
trated in Retail and Food Services occupations), even after adjusting for MSA population/income
and proximity to high population/income MSAs. Great Lakes, rivers, and other bodies of water did
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not have a measurable impact on total employment growth or on any particular occupation group’s
employment growth.
Overall, the employment and wage growth for occupations in the 1999 to 2004 time period was
largely homogeneous across MSAs of similar population and total income levels, with very little
regional, state or other variations that were not correlated with the wealth of the MSA. There were
differences in how employment and wages for different occupation groups changed nationwide, but
those changes were largely consistent across MSAs after accounting for MSA population/income.
2.3.3 Occupational Employment Changes
On average, occupation groups in the 1999 to 2004 sample moved somewhat consistently in two
general categories as recognized in the literature: Cognitive and Non-cognitive tasks. Occupa-
tions generally associated with cognitive tasks experienced greater proportional employment and
wage growth in most MSAs (naturally impacted by MSA wealth effects) than their non-cognitive
counterparts.
There were, however, some outliers: the largest declines in employment nationwide were among
managers/executives and production occupations, both of which saw employment declines of nearly
11% and 18% respectively. These occupation groups were clear outliers in employment changes
among occupation groups: Engineering occupations suffered the next-greatest loss in employment,
but employment in those occupations declined by only 3% on average nationwide.
The loss of production jobs affected metropolitan areas nationwide, but was especially pro-
nounced in poorer metropolitan areas and in the South. Production job loss in the south was also
more concentrated in textile and garment production and machinist occupations, while nationwide
there was a more even spread of proportional employment loss across all production types.
Management and executive employment loss also occurred nationwide, and, while it occurred
evenly across regions, wealthy metropolitan areas were much more likely to see large proportional
losses in employment for this occupation group, even after controlling for the relatively high
concentrations of managers/executives in those wealthy metropolitan areas.
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While there was wage growth across many different occupation types, executives and financial
occupations saw the greatest increases in real income. Workers in these professions experienced an
increase of locational average income of 17% across all metropolitan areas between 1999 and 2004.
But, this wage increase was not enough to offset the loss of employment that these occupations
experienced; the total income going to these occupations declined by approximately 20%. A lot of
this decline in upper-executive and financial employment and total income coincided with shocks
associated the dot-com bubble and 2001-2002 recession from which employment in those sectors
did not recover by 2004.
These high-income occupations were most likely to see large gains to average income in wealthy
metropolitan areas. Nearly all of the metropolitan areas that did not see a net increase in average
income for executives and financial occupations were in the poorer 50% of metropolitan areas
nationwide and most were located in the South or Midwest. Income changes for most other
occupation groups were more even across regions and metropolitan areas, with the exception of
education occupations and personal care and service occupations, which grew disproportionately
slowly in poorer metropolitan areas, particularly in the South.
2.4 Employment and Income Growth Distributions: 2006 to 2014
2.4.1 MSA Characteristics
At first glance, the general pattern of occupational employment and wage growth for the 2006-2014
period resembles that of the 1999-2004 period: the wealthiest MSAs did, on average, experience
the highest degrees of average occupational employment and wage growth. However, the degree of
heterogeneity across MSAs was much greater between 2006 and 2014 than between 1999 and 2004,
both within the set of wealthiest MSAs and between the wealthiest MSAs and lower-income MSAs.
The degree of heterogeneity in employment and wage growth between the same occupation groups
in different MSAs was much greater, as well.
Overall, there was less consistency in which occupation groups experienced substantial recovery
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and growth in employment across MSAs in the 2006-2014 period than in the 1999-2004 period, and
the wealth/population of an MSA seemed to have a lesser impact on occupational employment and
average wage growth within the MSA than in the 1999 to 2004 sample. Instead, This heterogeneity,
however, would only become apparent upon looking at the MSA-level data after 2006. In a national
level study like Autor et al. (6) or a longer time-horizon study these peculiarities would likely not be
detectable since they only appear to manifest at the MSA level during the recovery from the 2008
recession.
2.4.2 Cross-MSA Heterogeneity
MSAs which experienced relatively higher average wage growth or occupational employment
shared far fewer predictable characteristics in the 2006 to 2014 sample than in the 1999 to 2004
sample. For example, total MSA population/income, which seemed responsible for the majority
of cross-MSA heterogeneity in occupational employment and wage growth, had a much smaller
impact on employment and wage growth for most occupations in he 2006 to 2014 sample. While
MSA population and income were, on average, correlated with higher employment growth over the
period, the impact on average wage growth was negligible. Furthermore, there was a high degree of
inconsistency in occupational employment growth for many occupations even across MSAs with
similar total income levels. This inconsistency was not nearly as prevalent in the 1999 to 2004
sample.
For example, wealthy MSAs, on average, saw greater percent employment and wage growth
for traditionally cognitive occupations than less wealthy MSAs from 2006 to 2014. But, this effect
was driven almost completely by Financial and Management occupations’ employment and wage
growth in wealthy MSAs in the sample period. Other cognitive occupations were either much less
impacted by MSA wealthy on average or not impacted at all. This contrasts with the 1999-2004
sample period, in which most traditionally cognitive occupations benefited from higher percent
employment and wage increases in wealthier MSAs more uniformly. Traditionally non-cognitive
occupations also retained the average employment benefit from wealthy MSAs, but with a similar
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decrease in consistency across particular occupations relative to the 1999 to 2004 sample.
The proximity effects for MSAs in close proximity to wealthier MSAs and the coastal effects
observable in the 1999-2004 sample do not appear to exist in the 2006 to 2014 sample. But, in
the 2006-2014 sample regional and state effects are identifiable for MSAs that impact the average
employment and wage growth for some occupation groups. Region effects for the South and
Midwest regions are significant and negative: MSAs in the South and Midwest regions gained, on
average, approximately 3% and 2 % less employment across all occupation groups respectively
and experienced roughly 4 % less overall wage growth each compared to their similarly wealthy
counterparts in the Southwest, Northeast, and West regions.
In addition, within the South there were several states with significant additional negative fixed
effects on MSAs: Louisiana, Georgia, Mississippi, and Florida all had varying but significant state
effects on MSA employment growth (but not wage growth). There were some state fixed effects in
the Midwest, as well, but these were generally smaller and positive: MSAs in Illinois, Michigan,
and Minnesota had, on average, slightly higher occupational employment and wage growth than
their similar Midwestern counterparts in other states.
Finally, there were some regional and state effects in the Western and Northeastern regions in
which MSAs in those regions, especially in California, Washington, Massachusetts, and Connecticut
experienced higher average wage growth than similarly wealthy MSAs in other states and regions.
This reveals that there are clear differences between the characteristics of MSAs that experienced
the highest average employment and wage growth rates in the 1999 and 2004 sample and in the
2006 and 2014 sample. For the 1999 to 2004 sample, the most important factors in determining
average occupational and wage growth in an MSA were the starting wealth and population levels of
the MSAs themselves, with some minor effects from proximity to high-wealth MSAs and coastal
areas. Regional and state effects were generally insignificant. In the 2006-2014 sample, wealthier
MSAs did experience greater average employment and wage growth, but there was a lot more
inconsistency in employment and wage growth among MSAs of similar population and income
levels than between 1999 and 2004. In particular, regional and state effects seemed to impact MSA
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employment and wage growth to an extent that did not occur from 1999 to 2004.
2.4.3 Occupational Employment Changes
In the 1999-2004 sample, there was, in most MSAs, a clear connection between the cognitive nature
of an occupation and the employment and wage growth of that occupation over the sample: cognitive-
based occupations experienced faster employment growth and wage growth (as measured by percent
changes in employment or average income in an MSA) than their non-cognitive counterparts on
average. This fits with the theories of cognitive labor attachment found in Beaudry et al. (10) and
also makes sense given the high potential for increased competition in global markets and with
automated processes faced by many non-cognitive occupations over the time period (Autor et al.).
On average, at the national level, the general result that cognitive occupation groups experience
employment and income growth greater than their non-cognitive counterparts hold in the 2006-2014
time frame. But, just as the 2006 to 2014 time frame exhibited different average patterns for MSAs
compared to the 1999-2004 sample, so, too, did the occupation groups. Over the 1999-2004 sample
period, most occupation groups moved generally uniformly according to their typical cognitive vs.
non-cognitive designations (as in (6)) at the national and MSA level. But, in the 2006-2014 time
frame, the cognitive vs. non-cognitive designation seems less significant.
The first and most obvious major difference between the 1999-2004 and 2006-2014 samples is,
however, the size of the average difference in employment and income growth between cognitive and
non-cognitive occupations. If we look at the two categories together, the impact of being a cognitive
occupation is much smaller than in the 1999-2004 sample. So, on average cognitive occupations
within an MSA did not grow in income or employment by as much relative to non-cognitive
occupations. The same general result appears if we look at the aggregation of all MSAs.
In the 2006 to 2014 time frame, the traditional categorization of occupation (Cognitive vs. Non-
cognitive) seemed to matter less for employment changes than the average wage of the occupation
in 2006. Though there is some correlation between the cognitive nature of the occupation and
the average wage, in the 2006-2014 time frame some cognitive occupation groups (most notably
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Education, Architectural, and Mathematical/Engineering occupations) saw employment and wage
growth more similar to non-Cognitive occupation groups with similar average income levels than
with other Cognitive occupation groups in the same MSA.
One possible explanation could be that, through the evolution of technology between 1999 and
2014, some occupations transitioned between involving generally cognitive vs. non-cognitive tasks.
But, even this inconsistency was not highly consistent within the sample period. There were some
regions and states in which the cognitive vs. non-cognitive distinction did serve as a significant
predictor of relative employment and wage growth within MSAs.
Incidentally, the regions and states where traditionally cognitive occupations exhibited patterns
more similar to their non-cognitive counterparts had substantial overlap with the regions and states
in which the MSAs experienced below average employment and wage growth: the South and
Midwest, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Oklahoma, in particular2, tended to have
labor markets at the MSA level in which traditionally cognitive occupations experienced wage
and employment growth more similar to non-cognitive occupations than in other parts of the
country. Nationwide, however, Education occupations, particularly public school K-12 educators,
were the ”cognitive” occupation most likely to have employment and wages move alongside their
non-cognitive counterparts in an MSA rather than other cognitive occupations.
The idea that some tasks have changed from cognitive to non-cognitive over the total sample
period likely cannot explain the drastic change in patterns that some occupation groups demonstrate
in the 2006-2014 time period (compared to the 1999-2004 period), at least not entirely. There is no
independent reason to believe that an architecture, education, or engineering job is cognitive in one
location and non-cognitive in another.
While overall employment nationwide increased by around 3% between 2006 and 2014, the
employment structure in most locations and in the national average shows a decline in employment
2West Virginia also, but since Charlottesville, WV was the only MSA from West Virginia in the sample that could
be something particular to that MSA instead of the state itself.
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in occupations with real3 average annual incomes between $60,000 and $80,000, most of which
would be classified as Cognitive tasks. On the national level, employment in these occupations
declined by approximately 7%. Loss in employment in Architectural and Engineering occupations,
Computing and Mathematical occupations, and Business and Financial occupations drove the
decline in Cognitive-task employment for most metropolitan areas.
There was also a decline in nationwide employment for occupations making less than $35,000
annually of approximately 6%. Nearly all metropolitan areas saw a decline in employment in
occupation groups with annual incomes in this range. This may be because the OES data only
factors in full-time employment, and the workers making $35,000 or less in 2006, many of whom
were concentrated in retail or food service occupations, may have been replaced with part-time
workers by 2014. Nationwide, this decline in full-time employment among workers making $35,000
or less annually was driven by declines in the Sales and Retail and Food Service occupational
employments. Approximately one third of metropolitan areas, however, saw larger declines in
employment in Transportation and Material Moving and Production occupations than in Sales/retail
and Food Service. This pattern of employment loss was most common in the South.
Occupations with average real incomes between $35,000 and $50,000 saw the largest net
gains in employment nationwide, increasing by approximately 12%, primarily in the Office and
Administrative Support occupations. Employment in occupations making more than $90,000 on
average annually rose by approximately 6% as well, though this is mostly due to increasing average
wages for Management occupations and Legal occupations in the wealthier 50% of metropolitan
areas and is not totally driven by changes in employment in any particular occupational group.
Locational income dispersion within an occupation group in 2006 (here measured as the differ-
ence between the top decile and median incomes for that occupation group in a given metropolitan
area) was negatively correlated with employment loss in an occupation within a metropolitan area,
even when average income of the occupation group was taken into account. This means that the
occupation groups that lost the most employment nationwide, like sales and retail or business and
3All wages and prices are given in 2006 dollars as valued in the Northeast region of the United States.
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financial occupations, were less likely to lose employment in metropolitan areas where there was
significant wage dispersion within the occupational group. Note that this correlation only exists
when looking at net employment changes between 2006 and 2014. Occupation groups with high
locational wage divergence in 2006 were actually more likely to lose employment between 2007
and 2009, but employment in those groups recovered much more quickly than those groups where
wage divergence was low in 2006.
Employment for the majority of occupation groups in metropolitan areas in the south failed
to return to 2006 levels by 2014. This problem was particularly pronounced in the Gulf Coast
states (Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Texas) where the majority of measured
metropolitan areas lost 5% or more of total 2006 employment by 2014. Notable exceptions to this
are the Atlanta, GA, Houston, TX, and Abilene, TX metropolitan areas, whose total employment
between 2006 and 2014 grew significantly above the national average.
The Northeast and West regions of the United States lost much less employment in their
metropolitan areas’ occupation groups than the South or Midwest did. Employment in metropolitan
areas in the Northeast and West regions grew by equivalent percentages (approximately 5 % on
average), but employment growth in the Northeast was highly concentrated in a few major cities
(New York, NY, Boston, MA, Philadelphia, PA), with smaller metropolitan areas growing much
more slowly or losing employment between 2006 and 2014. Growth in the West was much
more consistent, but spread out. metropolitan areas in the southern and eastern sections of the
West (Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, Montana) experienced slower average
employment growth than the Pacific coast state metropolitan areas on average, but even in those
states the majority of occupation groups returned to within 2% of 2006 employment levels by 2014.
We can see from these statistics that, between 2006 and 2014, full-time employment became
much more concentrated nationwide in occupations where the average wage was between $35,000
and $50,000 annually and much less concentrated in occupations making between $60,000 and
$90,000 annually. National employment also became more concentrated in the Northeast and
Western regions of the US, particularly on the Pacific coast (California, Washington, Oregon) and
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the largest cities in the Northeast and less concentrated in the South and Midwest.
2.5 Conclusion
The MSA and occupation group patterns in the 1999-2004 and 2006-2014 samples present a
strange series of patterns to explain. The dot-com recession and recovery of 1999-2004 exhibits
occupation group patterns that align with cognitive labor market theories as in Beaudry et al. (10) (or
a general DSGE model with differential capital accumulation across MSAs) and the general wage
and employment patterns identified in (6) or (40) at both the national and MSA level. Specifically,
MSAs with higher initial income/population levels tend to experience higher percentage growth in
income and employment than their less wealthy counterparts, with some marginal proximity and
coastal effects, while workers in cognitive-based tasks experience higher occupational employment
and wage growth on average than their non-cognitive peers.
The housing crisis recovery period, 2006 to 2014, however, has very different observable patterns
to its occupation growth and MSA growth: occupation groups’ employment and income growth
cannot be neatly summarized according to whether or not the occupation is traditionally a cognitive
or non-cognitive task. Some cognitive occupations even demonstrate occupation and wage dynamics
more similar to non-cognitive tasks in the same MSA than other cognitive task occupations (or even
the same cognitive task occupation in a different MSA). But, even these patterns vary by geographic
state and region, for reasons that I cannot identify in this analysis. The behavior or occupation
wage and employment growth for occupation groups does not seem nearly as neatly predictable by
prevailing cognitive-task theories of labor as does the 1999-2004 sample.
Even the MSA patterns in the 2006 to 2014 sample are much harder to solidly identify and
are not as easily intuitive to explain as the behavior of MSA patterns from 1999 to 2004. The
wealth/population effect still predisposes some MSAs to higher average employment growth and
income levels, but now there is a great deal of heterogeneity in average impact of MSA wealth on
employment and wage growth, and regional and state fixed effects appear much more significant.
It is possible that the increased duration and severity of the 2008 recession caused its recovery
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to behave wholly differently from that of the (relatively) recent dot-com bubble burst, but there are
likely other factors that have changed the labor market, as well. For example, given that regional and
state effects appear much more significant to both average MSA and occupational employment/wage
growth, it is possible that some policies were enacted or changed to alter labor dynamics in some
regions. Or, some of the cognitive requirements for certain occupations and tasks may have changed
between 1999 and 2014.
This work is not intended to definitively express any causal source of these patterns. Neither is it
truly intended to fully specify the exact structure in which the differences in spatial and occupational
heterogeneity emerge across the examined time periods: there are no structural estimations for any
of the variables in this paper. In fact, it was something that I intentionally avoided since, even now, I
am not certain of the full extent of the patterns that the data is exhibiting and do not feel comfortable
assuming any particular structure for estimation. But, after a great deal of examination of the data,
the patterns of spatial and occupational heterogeneity detailed in this paper appear simultaneously
strikingly different from what has been observed in the past and subtle enough that they could easily
be missed in aggregate data or in MSA-level data not specifically looking at the post-2008 crisis
recovery.
It will take more work, and likely future data, to fully determine what, if any, fundamental
changes occurred in the US labor market across MSAs to explain the observable differences in
the recovery from the 2008 housing crisis, and additional theoretical work to explain how those
changes came about. I hope this paper can serve as at least a piece of evidence that something, at
least, appears drastically different at the MSA level for the housing crisis recovery that, at least as
of now, appears wholly inconsistent with labor market theory and established patterns of recession
recovery in the United States.
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Figure 2.3: Average occupational income distribution for MSAs, 1999
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Figure 2.7: Average occupational income distribution for MSAs, 2004
Figure 2.8: Average occupational income distribution for MSAs, 2006
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Figure 2.9: d
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Figure 2.10: Average percent change in occupational employment by occupational income, 1999-
2004
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Figure 2.11: Average percent change in occupational employment by occupational income, 2006-
2014
46
Fi
gu
re
2.
12
:S
am
pl
e
in
co
m
e
di
st
ri
bu
tio
ns
by
av
er
ag
e
oc
cu
pa
tio
na
le
m
pl
oy
m
en
t,
19
99
-2
00
4
47
Figure
2.13:Sam
ple
incom
e
distributions
by
average
occupationalem
ploym
ent,2006-2014
48
Figure 2.14: Total national employment for selected occupation groups, 1999-2003
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Figure 2.15: Total national employment for selected occupation groups, 2006-2014
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CHAPTER 3
Appendix: Proofs
3.0.1 Proof of Lemma 1
In any equilibrium without bubbles it must be the case that the price of housing obeys:
pt − κ =
∑
j≥0
1
Πjk=0(1 + rt+k)
(
v′(hst+j)
u′(cst+j)
− κ
)
, (3.1)
Specifically, as demonstrated in the main text, there must exist a stationary equilibrium with the
housing equal to the maintenance cost κ in all periods. The asset pricing equation for savers then
gives a rule for the interest rate:
1 + rn =
v′(hsn)
βκu′(csn,o)
. (3.2)
In any bubble-less equilibrium with p = κ, cso,n =  + d¯. So, c
s
o,n is an exogenous constant. This
means that, for a given interest rate, u′(csn,y) = β(1 + rn)u
′(csn,o) is constant, as well. This means
that, for a given es,
v′(hsn) = v
′
(
es − csn,y − d¯ 11+rn
κ
)
,
and the equilibrium with p = κ must be an equilibrium with rn < 0 if es, κ sufficiently large.
3.0.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Part 1: Existence
We will now show that the bubble exists with b > 0 if and only if 1 + rn < 1. First, assume
1 + rn < 1. We know from budget constraints that the bubble exists with b > 0 in the steady state if
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and only if:
es > d¯+ csh,y − κv′−1(u′(csh,y)κ). (3.3)
This implies that the housing bubble can exist only if savers have some endowment left over
after lending, consuming the optimal amount in young age, and purchasing housing to satisfy utility
purposes. Note, however, that we know from budget constraints in the bubble-less equilibrium that:
es = d¯
1
1 + rn
+ csy,n − κv′−1(u′(csn,y)κ), (3.4)
which is the same condition as (3.3) only in the bubble-less equilibrium. Since the housing bubble
does not increase the fundamental value of housing ( v
′(hsh)
u′(csh,y)
is equal to κ in the housing bubble
equilibrium), with 1 + rn < 1, we know that:
es > d¯+ csh,y − v′−1(u′(csh,y))κ) · κ,
Now, suppose b > 0 and 1 + rn ≥ 1. Then, it must be the case that that savers find it optimal to
drive interest rates down below rn, purchase less housing, and consume less when young (relative
to the bubble-less equilibrium) to preserve v
′(hs)
u′(csy
= κ. Since the bubble-less allocation is always
feasible for savers (if savers choose b = 0), this must mean that there exists an allocation for savers
{hs < hsn, csy > csy,n, cso ≥ cs0,n, d¯} with equilibrium housing price p = pn and r < rn that is feasible
in the bubble-less equilibrium that yields strictly greater utility for savers than the bubble-less
equilibrium bundle. This cannot be the case since we know the bubble-less equilibrium bundle
to be optimal for unconstrained savers. Therefore: b > 0 ⇒ 1 + rn < 1. Thus, we have shown
b > 0⇔ 1 + rn < 1.
With these two results, we have shown b > 0 ⇔ rn < n, as desired. Intuitively, this result
shows that there can only be a housing bubble in equilibrium if there is insufficient storage in the
economy for savers to efficiently store wealth for old age in the equilibrium without a bubble.
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Part 2: Allocations and prices
With bh > 0 and 1 + rn < 1, housing allocations follow from the household budget constraints as
given in the Lemma.
Borrowers are credit constrained while savers are not:
ad = −d¯ = −as.
Borrowers’ consumption and housing asset holdings are given by:
hdh =
ed + d¯− cdh,y
ph
,
cdh,y = e− ph − csh,y,
cdo,h = bhh
d
h − d¯+ 
Savers’ consumption and housing asset holdings are given by:
hsh =
es − d¯− csh,y
ph
,
u′(csh,y) = βu
′(csh,o),
csh,o = bhh
s
h + d¯+ ,
with the housing price given by:
ph = κ+ bh. (3.5)
Part 3: Convergence
We know from the asset pricing equation for savers that the price of housing must obey:
pt − κ =
∑
j≥0
1
Πjk=0(1 + rt+k)
(
v′(hst+j)
u′(cst+j)
− κ
)
+ lim
j→∞
pt+j+1 − κ
Πjk=1(1 + rt+k)
,
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which means that the only way the price of housing can converge to a steady state with a positive
bubble component is when:
1 + rh =
v′(hsh)
βκu′(csh,o)
= 1,
κ =
v′(hsh)
u′(csh,y)
. (3.6)
Since there is a unique interest rate at which the bubble can exist and, for a given interest rate,
a unique size of the bubble that allows for κ = v
′(hsh)
u′(csh,y)
, and all equilibria in this model must be
stationary, there must exist a unique bubble value in equilibrium given by:
bh = p− κ.
3.0.3 Proof of Lemma 4
Savers must have greater purchasing power when young in a steady state with a housing bubble than
in a steady state without one since 1 + rn < 1. Also, since savers will be spending fewer resources
on lending (κ+ b)hsh > κh
s
n, and savers can consume more when old under a housing bubble than
when there are no bubbles (since reselling housing now yields consumption in old age net of the
maintenance cost on housing).
Formally, denote lifetime welfare for savers with net housing price and interest rate p = κ+ bh
and r = 0 (as in the housing bubble equilibrium) as U sh(h
s, csy, c
s
o, a
s). Suppose savers choose to
acquire the bubble-less equilibrium bundle when young: hs = hsn, c
s
y = c
s
y,n, a
s = d¯. This bundle is
feasible under housing bubble equilibrium prices and leads to old age consumption cso = bh
s
n + d¯.
Comparing cso with c
s
o,n, we see that c
s
o − cso,n = bhsn > 0. Therefore, the bundle for the bubble-less
equilibrium is feasible under the housing bubble and
U sh(h
s
h, c
s
y,h, c
s
o,h, d¯) ≥ U sh(hsn, csy,n, cso, d¯) > U sn(hsn, csy,n, cso,n, d¯),
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where U sn(h, cy, co, a) is savers’ welfare with the price and interest rate of the bubble-less equilibrium
with bundle (h, cy, co, a).
The housing bubble thus improves savers’ lifetime utilities in the steady state by raising the
interest rate on debt and making housing a more efficient store of value. Intuitively, savers are
better able to consume and acquire housing when young due to the increased interest rate, while
the bubble component of the housing price allows them to more efficiently store wealth for old age
consumption.
3.0.4 Proof of Lemma 5
The total purchasing power of young borrowers in any equilibrium is given by ed + d¯ 1
1+r
. Therefore,
young borrowers have more purchasing power in a bubble-less steady state compared to a housing
bubble steady state if and only if ed+d¯ 1
1+rn
> ed+d¯. This inequality is always satisfied if 1+rn < 1.
Since borrowers have access to less wealth in the housing bubble steady state than in the bubble-less
steady state, it must also be that: cdy,h + phh
d
h < c
d
y,n + pnh
d
n.
Consider the two possibilities: cdy,h ≥ cdy,n or cdy,h < cdy,n. If cdy,h < cdy,n, the borrowers’ fist
order condition shows that, if cdy,h < c
d
y,n, then h
d
h < h
d
n. The only way borrowers could experience
greater welfare in this case is if the bubble helps borrowers save for old-age consumption through
their housing acquisition. But, if sacrificing young-age consumption and housing for old-age
consumption is optimal for the borrower, then borrowers could take on less debt in the bubble-less
steady state, acquire hd < hdn, c
d
y ≤ cdy,n, and consume more when old. Formally, there must exist
φ > 0 such that:
Udn
(
hdn −
φ
(1 + rn)pn
, cdy, , c
d
o,n + φ, d¯− φ
)
> Udn(h
d
n, c
d
y,n, c
d
n, d¯),
where Udn(h, cy, co, a) denotes the borrowers’ welfare with price p = pn and interest rate r = rn.
This is impossible since the bundle (hdn, c
d
y,n, c
d
o,n, d¯) is optimal for borrowers in the bubble-less
equilibrium.
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Similarly, if cdy,h ≥ cdy,n, then phhdh < pnhdn, which implies that hdh < hdn. If it is optimal to
sacrifice housing (and, hence, old age consumption) for young age consumption in a bundle that is
feasible in the bubble-less equilibrium, then there must exist φ > 0 such that:
Udn
(
hdn −
φ
(1 + rn)pn
, cdy,n + φ, c
d
n − φ, d¯
)
> Udn(h
d
n, c
d
n, c
d
n, d¯),
which is impossible since (hdn, c
d
n, c
d
n, d¯) is the optimal bundle for borrowers in the bubble-less
equilibrium. Therefore, the housing bubble reduces welfare for borrowers.
Intuitively, the bubble on housing introduces two difficulties for credit-constrained borrowers:
first, the interest rate on debt increases, which makes borrowing to acquire housing and consume
when young more expensive, second, the bubble increases the cost of acquiring housing. This
means that, when there is a housing bubble, borrowers must pay more over their lifetimes in debt to
pay for housing at the inflated cost with the bubble. This leads to less lifetime consumption and
less housing for borrowers. The bubble does make housing a more efficient store of value, but, if
borrowers are already debt constrained, sacrificing young age consumption and housing for old age
consumption cannot possibly improve their welfare.
It is important to remember that this unambiguously negative impact of the housing bubble on
borrower welfare is brought about first by the bubble’s increase in the interest rate, and second by
its attachment to an object from which the households derive utility. If the bubble were attached to
something that only yielded consumption in old age or was a store of value, as in the pure bubble
case, borrowers could ignore the bubble asset completely, or would care only about the amount of
wealth stored in the bubble asset instead of the amount of the bubble asset acquired.
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3.0.5 Proof of Lemma 7
Part 1: Existence
We will now show that the bubble exists with b˜ > 0 if and only if 1 + rn < 1. First, assume
1 + rn < 1. We know from (1.24) that the bubble exists with b˜ > 0 in the steady state if and only if:
es > d¯+ csp,y − κv′−1(u′(csp,y)κ). (3.7)
This implies that the pure bubble can exist only if savers have some endowment left over after
lending, consuming the optimal amount in young age, and purchasing housing to satisfy utility
purposes. Note, however, that we know from (1.22) in the bubble-less equilibrium that:
es = d¯
1
1 + rn
+ csy,n − κv′−1(u′(csn,y)κ), (3.8)
which is the same condition as (3.7) only in the bubble-less equilibrium. Since the pure bubble
cannot increase the price of housing, with 1 + rn < 1, we know that:
es > d¯+ csp,y − v′−1(u′(csp,y))κ) · κ,
Now, suppose b˜ > 0 and 1 + rn ≥ 1. Then, it must be the case that that savers find it optimal to
drive interest rates down below rn, purchase less housing, and consume less when young (relative
to the bubble-less equilibrium) to preserve v
′(hs)
u′(csy
= κ. Since the bubble-less allocation is always
feasible for savers (if savers choose b˜ = 0), this must mean that there exists an allocation for savers
{hs < hsn, csy > csy,n, cso ≥ cs0,n, d¯} with equilibrium housing price p = pn and r < rn that is feasible
in the bubble-less equilibrium that yields strictly greater utility for savers than the bubble-less
equilibrium bundle. This cannot be the case since we know the bubble-less equilibrium bundle
to be optimal for unconstrained savers. Therefore: b˜ > 0 ⇒ 1 + rn < 1. Thus, we have shown
b˜ > 0⇔ 1 + rn < 1.
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Part 2: Allocations and prices
First, we show that the debt constraint and short-selling constraint on the bubble asset must either
both bind or both be nonbinding. First order conditions from the household’s problem yield the
following rule for debt and bubble acquisition:
λid,tb˜ = λ
i
b,t,
where λd,t and λb,t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the binding credit constraint and
binding short-selling constraint on the bubble respectively and i ∈ {s, d}. Given b˜ > 0, the debt
constraint is non-binding if and only if the bubble asset short-selling constraint is non-binding. This
means that a credit constrained household will never invest in the bubble asset, while a non-credit
constrained household always will. Intuitively, the same household will never find it optimal both to
save with the bubble and take on debt. Therefore, with pp and b˜ as determined by (1.23) and (1.24)
respectively, all allocations are as given in the lemma.
Part 3: Convergence
In any period t, the no arbitrage condition on the bubble asset requires that the bubble grows at the
interest rate:
b˜t+1 = (1 + rt)b˜t.
This no arbitrage condition gives b˜t+1 as a function of rt and b˜t: b˜t+1 = g(rt, b˜t). Note that
∂g
∂rt
= b˜t ≥ 0, i.e., the bubble size in t + 1 is an increasing function in the interest rate rt.
Furthermore, savers’ first order conditions yield:
1 + rt =
v′(hst)
κu′(cst+1,o)
.
From the savers’ young-age budget constraint we know that hst is decreasing in b˜t. We also
know that an increase in the bubble price b˜t will increase old-age consumption for savers. Therefore,
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we can express the interest rate as a function of b˜t: rt = f(b˜t) with ∂f∂b˜t given by:
∂f
∂b˜t
=
v′′(hst)
κu′(cst+1,o)
∂hst
∂b˜t
− v
′(hst)
κ(u′(cst+1,o))2
u′′(cst+1,o)
∂cst+1,o
∂b˜t
> 0. (3.9)
This implies that the interest rate rt = f(b˜t) is increasing in the size of the bubble b˜t. Therefore
the equilibrium dynamics can be characterized by the following equations, with b˜t being the state
variable:
rt = f(b˜t),
b˜t+1 = g(rt, b˜t),
with f and g both monotonic in b˜t and rt, respectively. Note that rt = 0 and b˜t = b˜ is the unique
steady state of this system. Now suppose that the initial bubble size is small: b˜0 < b˜. Then,
r0 = f(b˜0) < f(b˜) = 0. This means that, in period t = 1:
b˜1 = g(r0) = (1 + r0)b˜0 < b˜0.
This inequality implies that r1 = f(b˜1) < r0 < 0, and b˜2 = g(r1) = (1 + r1)b˜1 < b˜1. By induction,
we can prove that {b˜t}∞t=0 and {rt}∞t=0 are decreasing sequences. Therefore, at any period t:
b˜t =
[
Πt−1s=0 (1 + rs)
]
b˜0 ≤ (1 + r0)t b˜0.
Since 1+r0 < 1, it follows that limt→∞ b˜t ≤ limt→∞ (1 + r0)t b˜0 = 0. Thus, in any pure equilibrium
with initial b˜0 < b˜, it must be that the bubble vanishes: limt→ b˜t = 0.
Now, suppose b˜0 > b˜. Then r0 = f(b˜0) > f(b˜) = n and
b˜1 = g(ro) = (1 + r0)b˜0 > b˜0,
Which means that r1 = f(b˜1) > r0 and b˜2 = g(r1) = (1 + r1)b˜1 > b˜1. By induction, we can prove
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that {b˜t}∞t=0 and {rt}∞t=0 are increasing sequences. Therefore, at any time t, b˜t given by
b˜t =
[
Πt−1s=0 (1 + rs)
]
b˜0 ≥ (1 + r0)t b˜0.
Since 1 + r0 > 1, it follows that the bubble explodes to infinity: limt→∞ b˜t = ∞. Therefore, the
bubble economy converges to the bubble steady state only when the initial bubble is b˜0 = b˜.
3.0.6 Proof of Lemma 8
Since we assume es sufficiently large that rn < 0 we know that the bubble-less allocation is feasible
but not optimal in the pure bubble equilibrium. Formally, we can define b′ such that 0 < b′ < b˜.
We can then define h′ as the housing and hsp ≤ h′, and let c′y ≤ csy,n. With a bubble of size b′ > 0,
it must then be that c′o ≥ cso,n since rn < n. Therefore there exists a feasible bundle of housing
under the pure bubble equilibrium that strictly dominates the optimal bundle for the bubble-less
equilibrium and :
U(hsn, c
s
y,n, c
s
o,n) < U(h
′, csy,n, c
′
o) ≤ U(hsp, csy,p, cso,p).
3.0.7 Proof of Lemma 9
We show in this proof that borrowers experience lower lifetime welfare under a pure bubble than in
the bubble-less equilibrium. Since we know that credit constrained borrowers will not purchase the
bubble asset in equilibrium, the budget constraints for borrowers in the bubble-less and pure bubble
equilibria respectively will be:
ed + d¯
1
1 + rn
= κhdn + c
d
n,y, (3.10)
ed + d¯ = κhdp + c
d
p,y, (3.11)
which, when rn < 0, implies that κhdn + c
d
n,y > κh
d
p + c
d
p,y. This means that the borrowers’ pure
bubble bundle of housing and consumption must be feasible but non-optimal in the bubble-less
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equilibrium and:
Udp < U
d
n.
3.0.8 Proof of Corollary 10
Part 1: Comparison of savers’ welfare
Since both bubble equilibria must have the same interest rate, the preferable equilibrium for
savers will be the equilibrium that allows savers to most efficiently save for old age consumption.
Old age budget constraints reveal:
csh,o = bhh
s
h + d¯+ , (3.12)
csp,o = b˜+ d¯+ , (3.13)
which means that, per unit size of the bubble, the pure bubble must allow for a greater increase
in old age consumption (relative to the bubble-less equilibrium) since it will never be the case
that hs = 1 in any equilibrium. Intuitively, this is because of two factors: first, it is feasible (and
optimal) for the savers to acquire all of the bubble for storage in the pure bubble equilibrium, while
in the housing bubble equilibrium borrowers will be in competition for the bubble, as well, as it is
attached to housing which they need to satisfy utility demand. Second, when housing is the bubble
asset there is still the maintenance cost κ that must be spent before resale of housing, which makes
housing a relatively inefficient means of storage (compared to the pure bubble).
Therefore, for bubbles of equal size, as long as 1 > hsh, savers have greater utility in the pure
bubble equilibrium than in the housing bubble equilibrium and U sp > U
s
h.
Part 2: Comparison of borrowers’ welfare
In any equilibrium with credit constrained borrowers, welfare of borrowers is determined by
how much housing and consumption borrowers are able to acquire when young. Since borrowers
can take on the same amount of debt in either bubble equilibrium (1 + r = 1 in both equilibria), we
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know that:
κhsd + c
d
y,p = (κ+ bh)h
s
h + c
d
y,p,
From this equation we can see that the housing bubble bundle for young borrowers is feasible but
non-optimal in the pure bubble equilibrium since we know that, as long as the housing bubble exists
with bh > 0, κ = pp = pn < ph. Therefore, borrowers experience higher welfare under the pure
bubble than in a housing bubble and Udp > U
d
h .
64
REFERENCES
Aiyagari, R. S. (1994). Uninsured idiosyncratic risk and aggregate saving. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 109(3):659–684.
Arce, O´. and Lo´pez-Salido, D. (2011). Housing bubbles. American Economic Journal: Macroeco-
nomics, 3(1):212–241.
Autor, D., Dorn, D., Katz, L. F., Patterson, C., and Reenen, J. V. (2017). The fall of the labor share
and the rise of superstar firms. Institute of Labor Economics.
Autor, D., Levy, F., and Murnane, R. (2003). The skill content recent technology change: An
empirical exploration. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4):1279–1333.
Autor, D. H., Dorn, D., Hanson, G. H., and Song, J. Trade adjustment: Worker level evidence.
MIT Department of Economics Working Paper Series, (13-21).
Autor, D. H., Katz, L. F., and Kearney, M. S. (2008). Trends in u.s. wage inequality: Re-assessing
the revisionists. The Review of Econometrics and Statistics, 90, No. 2.
Barkai, S. (2016). Declining labor and capital shares. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy
and the State University of Chicago Booth School of Business, New Working Paper Series(2).
Barlevy, G. (2014). A leverage-based model of speculative bubbles. Journal of Economic Theory,
153:459–505.
Basco, S. (2016). Switching bubbles: From outside to inside bubbles. European Economic Review.
Beaudry, P., Green, D. A., and Sand, B. (2013). The great reversal in the demand for skill and
cognitive tasks. NBER Working Paper, No. 18901.
Bewley, T. (1977). The permanent income hypothesis: A theoretical formulation. Journal of
Economic Theory, 16(2):252–292.
Blanchard, O. J. and Watson, M. W. (1982). Bubbles, rational expectations and financial markets.
Bound, J. and Johnson, G. (1992). Changes in the structure of wages in the 1980s: An evalutaion
of alternative explanations. American Economic Review, 82, 371-92.
Brunnermeier, M. and Oehmke, M. (2012). Bubbles, financial crises, and systemic risk. Handbook
of the Economics of Finance, 2.
Brunnermeier, M. K. (2003). Asset pricing under asymmetric information: Bubbles, crashes,
technical analysis, and herding. Oxford University Press.
Caballero, R. J. and Krishnamurthy, A. (2006). Bubbles and capital flow volatility: Causes and
risk management. Journal of Monetary Economics, 53(1):35–53.
65
Diamond, P. A. (1965). National debt in a neoclassical growth model. The American Economic
Review, 55(5):1126–1150.
Doblas-Madrid, A. (2012). A robust model of bubbles with multidimensional uncertainty. Econo-
metrica, pages 1845–1893.
Doblas-Madrid, A. and Lansing, K. (2014). Credit-fuelled bubbles. Working paper.
Eggertsson, G. B. and Krugman, P. (2012). Debt, deleveraging, and the liquidity trap: A Fisher-
Minsky-Koo approach. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(3):1469–1513.
Fang, H., Gu, Q., Xiong, W., and Zhou, L.-A. (2015). Demystifying the Chinese housing boom.
Technical report, NBER Working Paper.
Grossman, G. M. and Yanagawa, N. (1993). Asset bubbles and endogenous growth. Journal of
Monetary Economics, 31(1):3–19.
Hillebrand, M. and Kikuchi, T. (2015). A mechanism for booms and busts in housing prices.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 51:204–217.
Hirano, T., Inaba, M., and Yanagawa, N. (2015). Asset bubbles and bailouts. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 76:S71–S89.
Hirano, T. and Yanagawa, N. (2010). Asset bubbles, endogenous growth, and financial frictions.
Working Paper.
Huggett, M. (1993). The risk-free rate in heterogeneous-agent incomplete-insurance economies.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Controls, 17:953–969.
Hunter, W. C. (2005). Asset price bubbles: The implications for monetary, regulatory, and
international policies. MIT press.
Ikeda, D. and Phan, T. (2014). Asset bubbles and global imbalances. Working Paper.
Ikeda, D. and Phan, T. (2016). Toxic asset bubbles. Economic Theory, 61(2):241–271.
King, I. and Ferguson, D. (1993). Dynamic inefficiency, endogenous growth, and Ponzi games.
Journal of Monetary Economics, 32(1):79–104.
Lorenzoni, G. (2008). Inefficient credit booms. The Review of Economic Studies, 75(3):809–833.
Martin, A. and Ventura, J. (2012). Economic growth with bubbles. American Economic Review,
102(6):3033–3058.
Mian, A. and Sufi, A. (2014). House of Debt: How They (and You) Caused the Great Recession,
and How We Can Prevent It from Happening Again. University of Chicago Press.
Miao, J. (2014). Introduction to economic theory of bubbles. Journal of Mathematical Economics.
Miao, J. and Wang, P. (2011). Bubbles and credit constraints. Working Paper.
66
Miao, J. and Wang, P. (2012). Bubbles and total factor productivity. American Economic Review,
Papers and Proceedings, 102(3):82–87.
Miao, J., Wang, P., and Zhou, J. (2015). Asset bubbles, collateral, and policy analysis. Journal of
Monetary Economics, 76:S57–S70.
Saint-Paul, G. (1992). Fiscal policy in an endogenous growth model. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 107(4):1243–1259.
Samuelson, P. A. (1958). An exact consumption-loan model of interest with or without the social
contrivance of money. The Journal of Political Economy, 66(6):467–482.
Song, J., Price, D. J., Guvenen, F., Bloom, N., and von Wachter, T. (2016). Firming up inequality.
Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Tirole, J. (1985). Asset bubbles and overlapping generations. Econometrica, 53(6):1499–1528.
Wang, P. and Wen, Y. (2012). Speculative bubbles and financial crises. American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics, 4(3):184–221.
Zhao, B. (2015). Rational housing bubble. Economic Theory, 60(1):141–201.
67
